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SOME CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE. UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT.a

W

HAT is Constitutional Law in the United States. and how
has it come to be what it is? Is it judge-made law or en
acted law? Is the United States Constitution the document
which was made by the drafters of the Constitution and its
Amendments, or the document which has been made 1v the Supreme Court in interpreting what the drafters did and filling in
the interstices left by the drafters? If our Federal Constitutional Law is in part or wholly judge-made law, what has been
the nature of the judicial process? Has it been analytical, historical, or philosophical, or a combination of all three? Hlave
the justices of the Supreme Court strictly adhered to precedents
on the rule of stare decisis, or have they treated precedents as
mere hypothetical conclusions to be abandoned later if proven
false after the test of further experience? If prior decisions
have been disregaided or overruled.- has it been because of a
change in the personnel of the bench, or because of a change in
the views of the justices, or because of a change in social conditions? Can our constitutional history be divided into different
periods with distinct characteristics or has it been one long
period? Has there been growth and development in our Constitutional Law, or merely change? Is our Constitutional Law
better or worse today than it was in 1789?
These, among other, questions concerning our Constitutional
a In order to economize on space and not to make this article unduly long,
the statement of the facts of the cases has been omitted. Perhaps it is not
too much to expect that those interested enough in this article to read it
will be sufficiently familiar with Constitutional Law and the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, either to recall the specific operative facts in
the various decisions referred to or have enough general background to supply them or to understand the discussion without them.-The Author.
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Law and history, will occur to any student, teacher or practitioner
who is interested in the work of our-Supreme Court. The only
way to find a satisfactory answer to such questions is by an examination of the work of the Supreme Court as found in its
published decisions. This study is an undertaking to make such
an examination. In this article, however, no attempt will be
made to examine all the decisions of the Supreme Court, because
it is believed that such an attempt would be as unnecessary as it
would be impossible. Only the conflicting but all the most important decisions' of this sort will be examined. Some of the
questions could be answered by an examination of other than
conflicting decisions and most of these are of cumulative importance.' Yet -most of the questions could not be answered by
an examination of non-coiflicting decisions, and all of them can
be answered by an examination of the coniflicting decisions. As
conflicting decisions we shall include both cases in conflict 1;ecause a later Overrules an earlier, and cases in conflict -because
their doctrines cannot be reconciled, or because a doctrine of one
is qUalified or modified by another. We shall, therefore, undertake to study Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.
With this end in view let us examine first, some decisions of
the Supreme Court upon that provision of the United States
Constitution which provides: "No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." 2
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck.' in an opinion by John Marshall, the court decided that grants (executed contracts) are included within the protection of the Constitution, in spite of the
fact that the Constitution forbids the impairment only of the
obligation of contracts which is supposed to be executory; and
in the Dartmouth College Case,4 in another opinion written by
John Marshall, the court held that a corporate charter of a charitable corporation is not only such a contract, rather than a mere
law which can be repealed by subsequent legislation, 5 so that its
See incidental references infra.
" Art. I, Sec. 10.
6 Cranch, 87 (1810).
"4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
- Cf. Wisconsin Co. v. Powers. 191 U. S. 379 (1903).
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obligation is impaired by a subsequent law of a state, but also
that its obligation is impaired though the state passes its law in
the exercise of the police power, or taxation, or eminent domain.
At least this was the construction put upon the Dartmnouth College Case by the cases which immediately followed it. and these
cases also uniformly accepted the proposition that its doctrine
was applicable to all kinds of private business corporations!' Yet
the courts have always held that private contracts between individuals are subject to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the power of taxation, and the police power.7 The rule of
the Dartmouth College Case, in protecting l)rivate corporations
against political action for fifty years, had much to do with the
extraordinary development of private corporations in the United
States. It is said that the case has been cited more times as a
judicial precedent than any other case ever decided by a court. It
is probably the most celebrated of John 'Marshall's opinions.
Is the Dartmouth College Case still law or are there subsequent
cases in conflict with it which either overrule it or modifv it ?
In the case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge s the
Supreme Court limited the doctrine of the Dartnionih College
Case by a rule of strict construction, so that if a charter was
poorly drawn it did not amount to much, but the court did not directly overrule the Dartmouth College Case. The opinion in the
Charles River Bridge case was written by Chief Justice Taney,
after he had succeeded Chief Justice Marshall and after Justices
Story and Thompson were the only two of the old court left. and
it has been followed by many subsequent decisions. "
Apparently the decision in the case of Charles River Bridqe v.
Warren Bridge, rather than the decision in the Dartinouth College Case, met with general favor with the public, but the public
evidently thought that Chief justice Taney's opinion had not
given it sufficient protection. for it began. in constitutions and
Bridge Pro. v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116 (1864): Piqua Bank v. Knoop.
16 How. 369 (1853).
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473 (1905) : 'Mtun v. Illinois,. 94 U. S

113 (1876).
11 Pet. 420 (1837).
Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville. 200 U. S. 22 (1906) : Stein v. Bienville Water Co., 141 U. S. 67 (1891); Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.
S. 659 (1878); supra note 6.
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statutes, to limit still further the doctrine of the Dartmourh College Cave by forbidding the grant of irrevocable charters, and
reserving the power to alter or repeal them: and the Supreme
Court held that such limitations were valid on the theory that
the" were a part of the obligation of the contract so that the repeal or alteration did not impair it, and consequently again indirectly modified the doctrine announced by Marshall. 0
Finally the Supreme Court in a long series of decisions gradually came to a position where it directly modified the doctrine
announced by Marshall and his immediate successors. Dissenting judges had always contended that a state could not abrogate
its sovereign powers of eminent domain, taxation, and police, and
In the
that the Dartmouth College Case should have so held."
eminent domain cases which came before the Supreme Court the
doctrine of the dissenting judges prevailed and the court held that
1 2
charters are subject to the exercise of this sovereign ppwer.
Then, after the personnel of the bench had again been changed,
as it had been in the time of Chief Justice Taney, and the dissenting Judge Miller had been joined by Chief Justice Waite,
Harlan and others who agreed with him, the court, in a series of
difficult cases which came before it, began to hold that charters
were subject to the exercise of the police power, first, as to public morals. 1" then as to public health,1 4 then as to public safety,'
and finally as to economic social interests.J 6 These cases did not
overrule the Dartmouth College Case, at least so far as it held
that a charter is a contract, but they did put important limitations
upon its doctrine.
However the Supreme Court has not applied its later doctrine
although the
to the regulation of the rates of public utilities
"0Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1882).
" Washington Univ. v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439 (1869); Piqua Bank v. Knoop,
supra note 6: Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 4.
1
Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 185 (1897); West Ridge
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (1848).
Stone v. Mississippi. 101 U. S. 814 (1879).
" Butchers, etc.. Co. v. Crescent City Co.. 111 U. S. 746 (1883).
13 Texas, etc., Co. v. Miller. 221 U. S. 408 (1911) ; New Orleans v. Louisiana Light Co.. 115 U. S. 650 (1885).
"1Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892).
W. Columbus, etc., Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919); Vicksburg v.
Vicksburg Waterworks Co.. 206 U. S. 496 (1907); Cleveland v. Cleveland
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power to fix such rates is recognized as a part of the police
power,18 and it has steadfastlv refused to apply its later doctrine
to taxation cases. 19 This makes the taxation cases and the rate
cases contra to the eminent domain cases, and all the police power
cases, except the rate cases, but in accord with the Dartmouth
College Case; and makes the eminent don-in cases and all the
police power cases, except the rate cases, in conflict with the Dartmouth College Case.
It will probably be generally agreed today that the Dartmouth
College Case was not correctly decided, and that it should have
held either that a charter of a corporation is not a contract at all
but a law or that it is a contract but subject to the exercise of the
sovereign powers of police, taxation, and eminent domain. The
latter view has become the modern view of the Supreme Court
and the Dartmouth College Case has been corrected accordingly
except as to taxation and rates. These exceptions are indefensible and doubtless in the course of time will be eliminated by the
Supreme Court so as to harmonize the taxation and rate cases
with the police power and eminent domain cases. But even now,
while it would be incorrect to say that the Dartmouth College Case
has been overruled, because it continues to be doctrine so far as
type it made a charter of a corporation a contract, yet, it would not
be accurate to say that it is still law, because it is no longer doctrine so far as it freed such contracts from the exercise of the police power and the power of eminent domain.
As a result of our study of the cases decided on the provision
against impairing the obligation of contracts, we see that we have
at the very outset both an illustration of judge-made laws by
means of interpretation, and an illustration of a judicial precedent, which has been treated as a hypothetical conclusion to be
abandoned later. In making this change the court invoked the
philosophical or sociological process, but in this case a change in
the personnel of the bench and changing social conditions had
City Ry., 194 U. S. 517 (1904); Detroit v. Detroit Citizens Ry.. 184 U. S.

368 (1902).
' Munn v. Illinois, supra note 7.
19 Lake Superior, etc., Mines v. Lord. 46 Sup. Ct. 627 (1926) : Roberts. etc..
Co. v. Emerson, 46 Sup. Ct. 375 (1926); Washington Univ. v. Rouse, supra
note 11; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, supra note 6.
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more to do with the change of the law than a change in -the views
of the justices. The result has been in the line of progress.
Next, let us examine some of the cases upon the subject of our
dual form of government.
It now seems to be agreed that the framers of our Constitution
made a dual form of government one of the chief characteristics
of our Constitution. This means that the Federal Government
was neither a league of nations, nor a government in which the
states were mere administrative units, but a federation of nations.
The nation was sovereign within its sphere and the states were
sovereign within their spheres. But the Constitution did not expressly say this. In fact neither the extreme federalists nor the
extreme states rights men believed it. The question was not settled until it was settled by Chief Justice Marshall in his great
opinions in the cases of McCullough v. Maryland20 and Gibbons
v. Ogden .21 In these cases he moved all doubt as to whether the
Constitution was a constitution or a compact and yet did not destroy the supremacy of the states within their field of reserved
powers. Thereby he made the Union a commonwealth of commonwealths, a nation of nations or states. This is another illustration, therefore, of judge-maae law. Marshall made this government a dual form of government through the analytical process by means of interpretation.
Have Marshall's decisions upon this question been followed as
precedents, or treated as hypothetical conclusions?
Marshall himself tended perhaps to break down his own doctrine of a dual form of government by deciding in favor of the
Federal Government whenever there was a question as to whether
a power was a state or federal power. In the great case of Cohltens
22
v. I'irinia,
by establishing the appellate jurisdiction of the Suprenie Court over the courts of the states, he practically made the
state courts inferior courts in the federal system. In his original
package (lecision2" he further extended the power of the Federal
4 Wheat. 306 (1819).
9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
0 Wheat. 264 (1821). For a recent case which. by requiring state courts
to enforce rights created by act of Congress, further tended to make the state
courts part of the federal system, see Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223
U. S. 1 (1912).
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1829).
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Government at the expense of the states. His doctrine of the implied powers of the Federal Government 2 4 also inevitably tended
in this same direction.
With the change in the personnel of the bench which came after the appointment of Chief Justice Taney the states rights
people expected to see Marshall's position in regard to our form
of government overthrown in favor of the states, yet Taney never
departed from the position that our government is a dual form of
government, and he rendered a number of opinions which vindicated the supremacy of the Federal Government within its
sphere.2 ' The situation continued thus up to the time of the
Civil War. After the Civil War the federalists, especially those
with corporate interests, hoped, under the privileges and imnumities and due process clauses, to see overthrown in favor of the
nation Marshall's position in regard to our dual form of government, but Justice Miller and the other majority members of the
Supreme Court doomed them to disappointment in their deci27
sions in the Slaughterhouse Cases 26 and the Civil Rights Cases.
At last, however, under a reconstituted court and the leadership
of Justice Field, who had formerly been a dissenting justice, the
Supreme Court began, and their successors have continued to enlarge the powers of the Federal Government at the expense of the
states in a way to seriously threaten the doctrine that this is a dual
form of government.. The Supreme Court extended the inhibition upon state action in the due process clause, not only to the
protection of the negroes but also to the protection of natural per2'
sons, in matters of substance 28 as well as of legal procedure,
" Gibbons v. Ogden, supro note 21: McCullough v. 'Maryland, su pra note 20.
= Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307 (1855) ; Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pa., 16
Pt. 539, 626 (1842).
16 Wall. 36 (1873).
109 U. S. 3 (1883).
"Wolff v. Ct. of Industrial Relations. 202 U. S. 522. 267 U. S. 552 (1923)
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923): -Minimum Wage Brd. v. Children's,
Hospital. 261 U. S. 525 (1923): United Mine Workers v. Coronado. etc., Co..
259 U. S. 344 (1922) : Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) : Lockner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) : Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U. S. 578 (1897) :
Reagan v. Farmers* Loan & Trust Co.. 154 U. S. 362 (1894) : Chicago, etc..
Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, etc., Com.. 134 U. S. 418 (1890): Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
=' Davidson v. New Orleans. 96 U. S. 97 (1878): .Murray v. Hoboken I.
& I. Co., 18 How. 272 (1855).
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and even to the protection of corporations in the matter of property rights.:"' so as to establish the supremac) of the national government over the states in all these important matters. It extended the power of the Federal Government over interstate commerce until it eliminated all jurisdiction of the states over even
intrastate commerce in some important lines of business. 3 ' In

lVeazie Bank v. Fenno :12 it held that Congress could tax the notes
of state banks so as to destroy their circulation, although it had
held in McCullough v. Maryland 33 that a state legislature could
not tax the notes of a federal bank. In South Carolina v. United
States 34 it held that the United States could tax the selling of
liquor though done by the state of South Carolina; but in North
Dakota v. Hanson " it held that North Dakota could not require

the holders of a federal retail liquor license to print notice thereof, post an affidavit of publication and pay a fee, and in Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee 36 it held that the State of Tennessee could

not tax land bought by the United States on the sale of land for
non-payment of United States taxes. In St. Louis v. W. U. Tel.
Co. 3 7 and in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co.3 it held
that the United States could condemn state property for federal
purposes; but in Utah P. & L. Co. v. United States 39 it held
that a state could not condemn federal land for state purposes. It
40
has extended the scope of the postal powers, the treaty powers 41

and the war powers 42 so as to threaten still further the doctrine
of the dual form of government. In the National Prohibition
Cases 43 the court held plainly that there is nothing in the ConCovington. etc., Co. v. Sanford, 164 U. S. 578- (1896); Minneapolis Ry.
v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1889).
" Commission v. Railway, 257 U. S. 563 (1922) ; Shreveport- Casej 234 U.
S. 342 (1914); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913).
= 8 Wall. 533 (1869).
' Supra note 20.
- 199 U. S. 437 (1905).
215 U. S. 515 (1910).
117 U. S. 151 (1886).
148 U. S. 92 (1893).
160 U. S. 168 (1895).
243 U. S. 389 (1917).
*Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1878).
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 (1870).
Y 253 U. S. 550 (1920).

CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT

stitution to prevent the absolute destruction of state sovereignty.
These decisions have worked a profound change in the character
of our dual form of government, if they have not entirely destroyed it. The states are certainly in the process of being reduced to the status of administrative units.
It is hard to believe, after reading such decisions as those referred to in the paragraph immediately preceding. that the decisions of John Marshall have been followed as precedents. The
constitutional principles which he first announced as to our dual
form of government have been modified and qualified and the
sphere of the Federal Government has rapidly been enlarged at
the expense of the states until now there is only one conclusion to
which we can come and that is that the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court upon this subject are in conflict with those of
John Marshall. His decisions were only hypothetical conclusions and they have been abandoned. Whether or not the recent
decisions are the better depends upon our political philosophy, but
so far as the growth of federalism has kept step with the growth
of business the writer is of the opinion that they are the better.
It would seem, however, in this instance that an important factor
in this constitutional change. or development, has been the personnel of the bench.
Next, we will consider some decisions of the Supreme Court
on the so-called interstate commerce clause, which gives Congress
the power "to regulafe commerce with foreign nations, and among
' 44
the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
The case of Gibbons v. Ogden 45 is the one with which to begin for a starting point in the discussion of the commerce clause.
In this case Webster made his greatest argument, and the decision in this case Beveridge says is Marshall's most important decision. It established in a liberal sense the power of the United
States against the states over interstate commerce. It gave a definition of commerce, yet not one clear enough to prevent later
conflicting decisions on the same question. It explained when
commerce commenced and when it ceased to be interstate, yet not
in such a way as to prevent later conflicting decisions on this question. It left open the question of who had the power to regulate
" U. S. Co.ST., Art. I. Sec. 8. clause 3.
'"

Supra note 21.
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interstate commerce. Whether or not the states had concurrent
power to regulate it in the absence of federal action was not decided because on this question Congress had legislated. Whether
after congressional action the states still had concurrent power of
regulation so long as its legislation was not in conflict with federal legislation, or only an incidental power to affect interstate
commerce in the exercise of the general police power, was left
undecided, although there was a strong intimation that it was the
latter. It did not decide whether or not a state could tax interstate commerce.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall said that commerce included
both traffic and commercial intercourse and therefore navigation.
In New York 'v. Miln 46 the Supreme Court declared that goods
were the subject of commerce but persons were not, but in Glocester Ferry Co. v. Pennsvlania4T and in Hoke v. United States 48
it held that commerce included the transportation of persons as
much as property, and in Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky 4 9 it
held that it included the passing and repassing of people on a
bridge. In Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co. 50 the
Supreme Court held that sending telegrams, in InternationalText
Book Co. v. Pigg "' it held that sending correspondence school information and paraphernalia, and in the Lotterv Case 52 it held that
sending lottery tickets were all subjects of commerce, although in
the earlier case of Paul v. IUirginia 53 it had held that making
contracts of insurance, and in the case of Blonenstock. etc.,
Agency v. Curtis Pub. ("o. 54 it held that making contracts for advertising were not commerce. Vague as was Marshall's definition, it is evident that the Supreme Court has since .his time enlarged upon his definition and that the distinctions now made between commerce and what is not commerce are either instances
of conflicting decisions or so fine that they are practically incomprehensible.
S11Pet. 102 (1837).
114 U. S. 196 (1885).

227 U. S.308 (1913).
154 U. S.204 (1894).
'

Supra note 40.
217 U. S. 91 (1q0).

188 U. S. 321 (1903).
8 Wall. 168 (1868).
" 252 U. S. 436 (1920).
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As to when commerce becomes interstate Marshall said, 5 "It
may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns
Commerce among the states
more states than one ........
must, of necessity, be commerce with the states. . . . The
power of Congress must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several states," but it has been difficult for subsequent cases to determine where interstate commerce begins and
where it ends. The Supreme Court has held that interstate commerce does not begin with the production or manufacture of
goods, even though definitely -destined for transportation to another state,- 6 nor with the machines of such production or manufacture, 5 7 nor with the hiovement of goods to the point of shipment so long as the goods are not actually delivered to the common carrier for shipment ;3 yet in the case of Dahnke-Walker I.
Co. v. Bondurant " it held that interstate commerce between Kentucky and Tennessee began with the purchase of wheat in Kentucky for shipment into Tennessee, and in the case of Lempke v.
Farmers' Grain Co.60 it held that interstate commerce began with
the deposit of wheat in grain elevators though not yet bought
(and though under state decisions the transaction between the depositor'and the elevator was a bailment), on the theory that the
grain was usually shipped to Minneapolis, 'Minnesota. If these
decisions are not in conflict, they draw a line which it is almost impossible to see. Marshall in the case of Brown. v. Maryland61 held
that foreign commerce does not end until after the goods have
been taken from the original package. In the case of Austin v.
Tennessee 02 the Supreme Court extended this rule to interstate
commerce so far as concerns regulation, but in the case of Brown
v. Houston 63 it refused to go so far as concerns taxation. These
cases clearly cannot be reconciled.
As to who has the power to regulate interstate commerce,
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 21.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (1888).

Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi. 257 U. S. 129 (1921).
' Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886).

'.

257 U. S. 282 (1921).
- 258 U. S. 50 (1922).
" Supra note 23.
F 179 U. S. 343 (1900).
"

114 U. S. 622 (1885).
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Webster had argued that the federal power was exclusive and
Marshall seemed in- Gibbons v. Ogden to acquiesce in this argument, yet five years later in the case of Willson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co21 4 Marshall took the position that the power of the
states was concurrent while the congressional power lay dormant.
This remained federal doctrine for twenty-five years or so.65 In
the case of Cooley v. Board of Port lVardens "' the Supreme
Court introduced the distinction hetween the. subjects of interstate commerce which are purely national in scope, or admit of
only one uniform plan of regulation. and all other subjects, and
held that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction of the former even
before legislation. and that the states had concurrent jurisdiction
over the latter in the absence of congressional legislation. This
distinction was followed for some time. 67
In recent times we
have heard less about the concurrent power of the states and more
about what Congress may do in regulating intrastate, commerce
as incidental to interstate commerce. 68 and more about what the
states may do in the exercise of their police power though it incidentally affects interstate commerce." ' Undoubtedly the better
view would he that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is exclusive, and that where intrastate and interstate business are so interwoven that they cannot be separated that Congress may regulate both," but that the states have a general police power under which they may regulate interstate commerce
incidentally so long as their statutes do not conflict with federal
statutes upon the same subject. However, it cannot be said that
this is vet federal law, because the earlier cases with reference to
the concurrent power of the states have notbeen overruled. They
still stand simply as conflicting cases.
As a proof of the conflict involved in these cases attention is
" 2 Pet. 245 (1829).
' Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (1866): License Cases, 5 How. 504

(1847).
12 How.299 (1851).
' Wabash. etc.. Co. v.Illinois. 118 U. S.557 (1886); Hall v.De Cuir. 95
U. S. 485 (1878): Welton v. Missouri. 91 U. S.275 (1875).
" Shreveport Case. supra note31; Leisy v. Hardin. 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
' Minnesota Rate Cases, supra note 31; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.

S.461 (1894).

" Shreveport Case, supra note 31.
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called to the License .Cases,7' decided in 1847, where the Supreme Court held that a New Hampshire license law was valid
as applied to liquors in the original package under the concurrent
power theory; to the case of Leisy v. Hardin72 decided in 1890,
where the Supreme Court held that an Iowa liquor law was unconstitutional as applied to liquors in the original package because a burden on interstate commerce both as to sale and as to
transportation, evidently on the theory that here was a subject
national in character, and to the case of Plumley v. Massachusetts,7

3

decided in 1894, where the Supreme Court upheld a

Massachusetts statute on the subject of colored oleomargarine as
applied to interstate original packages on the theory that it was a
proper exercise of the police power. It is hard to harmonize the
case of Leisy v. Hardin with either of the other cases. The Supreme Court pretended to reconcile the Plumley and Leis cases.
by showing that in the Plunde, Case there was the fact of "coloring in oleomargarine," while in the Leis, Case there was no fact
of "coloring", but admitted the License Case was overthrown.
The writer prefers the explanation that they are all in conflict and
that the reason for the conflict is the change in the personnel of
the bench. Leisy v. Hardin was a five to three decision, and
Plumley v. Massachusetts a five to four decision. Not one of the
judges who participated in the decision of the License Cases was
on the bench at the time of the decision in the Leisv Case. Only
two of the majority judges in the Leisy Case. Fuller and Field,
were on the bench at the time of the decision in the Plunlev Case,
and one of the dissenting judges in the Leis, Case wrote the opinion in the Plumley Case.
Again, the Supreme Court, in the case of Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co.,74 held that a tax on anthracite coal by Pennsylvania

was not an interference with interstate commerce though most of
the coal is shipped out of the state, but in Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia "-it held that the enforced withdrawal by West Virginia
of natural gas produced therein for the benefit of local consumers
"

Supra note 65.

Supra note 68.
; Supra note 69.
260 U. S. 245 (1922).
' 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
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is an "interference with interstate commerce . . . forbidden
by the Constitution." And in Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car
Co..76 the Supreme Court held that a tax of a definite sum levied
on an interstate corporation for the privilege of doing intrastate
business was not an interference with interstate business because
the interstate catrier could discontinue its intrastate business, but
in IVest. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas 77 it held that a tax of a given
per cent on the entire capital of an interstate corporation for the
privilege of doing intrastate business was an interference with interstate business, though if the corporation could discontinue its
intrastate business in the first case it would seem that it ought to
be able to do so in the second case, and if the state is master of its
local business in one case it ought to be in the other.
The power of regulating interstate commerce which has been
delegated to Congress is a police power, and in the exercise of this
power apparently the Supreme Court has held that anything which
may be prohibited by the states under their police pbwer, may,
when it is the subject of interstate commerce, be prohibited by
Congress. Accordingly, it has held constitutional a statute limiting the hours of service of employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce,7 8 an employers' liability act imposing a greater
liability than at common law upon railroads engaged in interstate
commerce for injury or death of any employee engaged in such
commerce,7 9 a statute making it a criminal offense to transport
lottery tickets in interstate commerce,8 0 a statute against the transportation of women and girls in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes,"' a pure food and drugs act,8 2 'and an act to punish the
counterfeiting and use of fictitious interstate bills of lading even
though they relate to no actual or contemplated commerce; 83 but
by a majority of five to four it held unconstitutional a federal
child labor law which prohibited the transportation in interstate
191 U. S. 197 (1903).
216 U. S. 1 (1910).
Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 221 U. S. 612 (1911).
Second Employers' Liability Cases,.223 U. S. 1 (1912).
Lottery Case, supra note 52.
Hoke v. United States, supra note 48.
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913); Hipolite Egg .Co. v.
United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911).
" United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919).
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commerce of the products of mines in which children under six-teen were employed, and the products of manufacturing establishments in which children under fourteen were employed, or in
which children under sixteen were allowed to work more than
eight hours a day, or before six in the morning or after seven at
night, on the theory that this was not a regulation of interstate
commerce but of mining and manufacturing.8 4 It is hard to ee
why the same objection cannot be made to the lottery, white slave.
and the food and drug acts, and the decision came as a surprise to
the profession.
In the case of Conway v. Taylor's Execcutor,8 3 the Supreme
Court took the position that a ferry was so local in nature that a
state had the exclusive power to regulate it though it plied on a
river which was the boundary between two states. but this doctrine was gradually modified by the decisions of Gloucester Ferry
6
Co. v.Pennsylvania,"
Covington v.Kentucky 17 Port Richnod
Ferry v.Hudson Co.,88 and Sault St. Marie v. In. Trans. Co.21'
until little is left of it and ferries have more and more been made
subject to regulation by Congress.
It seems apparent that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court upon the commerce clause are in hopeless conflict.
Not only is it impossible to harmonize the late cases with the early
cases, but it is impossible to harmonize the late cases. There has
been in the decisions a general trend in the direction of the enlargement of the powers of the Federal Government: but it cannot yet be said that there are any consistent, well-settled principies as to what is commerce, when it is interstate, who has the
power of regulation over it, or what may be done in the regulation of it. Most of the law in this connection is judge-made law.
although it has been made by the process of interpretation of an
express power granted to the Federal Government. Most of the
conflicts are probably due to changes in the personnel of the bench.
and the consequent introduction into the law of the personal views
of the justices or the views of the tin-es in which they lived.
' Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
'I1 Black, 603 (1862).
114 U. S. 196 (1884).
154 U. S. 204 (1894).
- 234 U. S. 324 (1913).

234. U. S.349 (1913).
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Next, let us turn our attention to some federal tax decisions of
the United States Supreme Court.
The Constitution provides that "No capitation or direct- tax
shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration
hereinbefore directed to be taken," 90 and it therefore becomes
important to know what is a direct tax. Hamilton was of the
opinion that the words meant capitation taxes, taxes on land, and
general taxes on all the property of individuals, but the Supreme
Court in the early case of Hylton v. United States9 1 held that
taxes on specific kinds of personal property (carriages) and on
occupations were excise and not direct taxes, and suggested that
the only direct taxes were taxes on land and capitation taxes, on
the theory that the determining, factor was the possibility of apportionment. In Scholey v. Rew 92 the Supreme Court held that
a tax on succession to real estate was not a direct tax but an excise tax on the privilege of taking by inheritance. In Springer v.
United Siates9 3 the Supreme Court by a unanimous decision held
that the Civil War income tax was not a direct tax but an excise
tax on the theory that direct taxes were "only capitation taxes
and taxes on real estate." But in Pollock v. Farmers'L. & 7.
Co.04 a five to four majority of the court presided over by Chief
Justice Fuller decided that a tax upon personal property or upon
the income therefrom is a direct tax, and thereby in effect overruled both the Springer v. United States and Hylton v. United
States cases. The result of this decision was the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, after which the Supreme Court said in
Brushaberv. Union Pac. R. R.95 that all federal income taxes are
now excises, but in spite thereof, in Eisner v. Macomber,9 6 within four years a majority of the same court held in another five to
four decision that an income tax on stock dividends is a direct
tax. After this decision in the Pollock case, it was thought that
the Supreme Court would hold that a tax on the succession to personal property would be held to be a direct tax, since the court
U. S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. 9, clause 4.
" 3 Dallas, 171 (1796).
23 Wall. 331 (1874).

'

- 102 U. S. 586 (1880).
157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
240 U. S. 1 (1916)
252 U. S. 189 (1920).
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had said in the Scholev case that an inheritance tax was not distinguishable from an income tax, but when the question was presented to the court in the case of Knowlton v. Moore 97 the court
discovered that an inheritance tax was an excise rather than a
direct tax and quite distinguishable from an income tax. How
are the decisions in the Eisner and Pollock cases to be accounted
for? The obvious answer is a change in the personnel of the
bench. But what were the new justices trying to accomplish by
their decisions? Very clearly they were not accomplishing certainty in the law. There was no moral interest which they were
trying to protect. Apparently their decisions were only an application of the legal philosophy of the Period of Maturity which
emphasized property and contract and freedom from legal control.
Can taxation, which clearly has for its purpose the raising of
revenue, also be used for the purpose of regulation? Here again
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are in conflict.
In some it has said "yes," while in others it has said "no." In
Veacie Bank v. Fenno 9 the Supreme Court upheld a tax upon
the notes of state banks although prohibitive and therefore eviIn the Head Money
dently for the purpose of regulation.
Cases 99 it upheld a tax of fifty cents levied upon the owners of
vessels for every passenger brought from a foreign port, though
"the power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power" but
a "mere incident of the regulation of commerce." A tariff enacted purely for protection and not for revenue would have to
be upheld, if at all, upon the same theory. In McCra, v. United
States 100 it upheld a tax of ten cents a pound upon oleomargarine
colored to look like butter as a legitimate subject of an excise tax
and held that the purpose of Congress was irrelevant, and that if
a power was conferred it made no difference if its exercise "was
either unwise, or unjust," or even for an "unlawful purpose."
In the last case it should be noted that a tax, though for purposes
of regulation, was upheld though not connected with any other
power given to Congress. But in the case of Bailey v. Dre.rel
- 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
" 8 Wall. 533 (1869).
- 112 U. S. 580(1884).
1- 195 U. S. 27 (1903).
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Furn.Co. 101 it declared unconstitutional a federal tax of ten per
cent of the net profits received for the sale of products of establishments employing child labor, on the ground that the tax was
"manifestly intended to regulate the employment of child labora matter reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment-and not
a tax;" and in the case of Trusler v. Crooks 102 it declared unconstitutional a tax on the privilege or option for a contract either
for the purchase or sale of grain, on the ground that it was a
penalty and not a tax. If the last two cases are good decisions it
is hard to see how the McCrav case at all events can be a good decision. It would seem as though it should have been overruled in
the Bailey case, but it has been left standing as a conflicting decision, so that we have one principle of constitutional law for
oleomargarine and another principle for child labor in the matter of the use of the power of taxation for purposes of regulation.
In the Bailey case, it is true, the court distinguished the Child
Labor Act from the Oleomargarine Act in that the former
showed on its face that it was a regulation while the latter did
not. This distinction is not entirely convincing, but we should
be glad that the court did not attempt to distinguish them on the
basis that the oleomargarine was "colored", while the children
were not "colored." The principle of the child labor decision also
would apply to a protective tariff which shows on its face that it
is for the purpose of regulation and not for revenue. Some industrious democrat ought to give a republican Supreme Court
an opportunity to distinguish between a child labor law and a
protective tariff of the sort referred to.
Another instance of conflict in the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court is found in connection with the question
of whether or not there is a federal common law. The justices of
the Supreme Court, when trying cases on circuit, at first held that
there was a federal common law of crimes and tried and punished
people for violations thereof without the support of any federal
statute,'0 3 but Justice Samuel Chase held the opposite view while
101 259

U. S. 20 (1922).

46 Sup. Ct. 165 (1926).

William's Case, Fed. Cas. 17,708 (1799); United States v. Warrall, 2
Dallas, 384 (1798) ; United States v. Ravara, 2 Dallas, 297 (1793); Henfield's Case, Fed. Cas. .6360 (1793).
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04
and in the
on circuit in the case of United ,States v. II arrall,1

case of United States v. Hudson, 0 5 Chase's view was acted upon
by the Supreme Court. Since the latter decision it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that there is no federal common law of crimes, 0 6 but the Supreme Court has found that, in

spite of the fact that the Constitution gives Congress the express
power to punish as crimes only "piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas," "offenses against the law of nations," "treason," and "counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the
United States," 107 it gives Congress the implied power to punish
"all crimes and offenses against the United States whether committed within one of the states of the union or within territory
over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction," 108 so that the

Federal Government, with this gift of federal statutory criminal
law, will apparently get along very well without any federal common law of crimes. 10 9

Is there a civil common law of the United

States? The Supreme Court apparently at first took the position
that there is not. The Judiciary Act of 1789 required the federal
courts to apply "the laws of the several states" "as rules of decision in trials at common law," except where the Constitution.
treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise provide. In
the case of Jackson v. Clew," ° the court held, in a case involving
real property, that it was bound to follow the local law whether it
grew out of a statute or out of the common law. At this time the
court evidently took the position that when parties got into the
federal courts on the ground of diversity of citizenship, and the
federal courts had to apply the common law, it must be the common law of the state where the federal court was sitting. But in
the cases of Swift v. Tyson, i ' Railroad v. Lockwood,i "2 Liverpool v. Pheniix,113 and other similar cases the court confined the
" Supra note 103.
7 Cranch, 32 (1812).
at 379.
U. S. CoVsT., Art. I, Sec. 8; ibid., Art. III, Sec. 3.
Logan v. United States, 144 U. S.263 (1891) ; E.r parth Scibold, 100
U. S. 371 (1880).
Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) : Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920).
,1012 Wheat. 153 (1827).
BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.

11

m 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
17 Wall. 357 (1873).

11
"

129 U. S. 397 (1889).
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application of the rule of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to state
statutes and real property and refused to apply local common law
in the field of commercial transactions and liability for torts
generally, but instead applied those principles of the common law
which it chose to adopt; and thereby began to develop a true,
judge-made, federal, civil, common law.
In the matter of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" the
Supreme Court at first followed the English rule which limited ad4
miralty jurisdiction to waters where the tide ebbed and flowed.'
However, in the United States this excluded from admiralty jurisdiction the Great Lakes and our important navigable rivers, and
the Supreme Court later changed its position, overruled the earlier
cases, and extended the admiralty jurisdiction to all public navigable streams in the United States. This was done first with
reference to the Great Lakes in a notable opinion by Chief justice Taney in the case of Thw Genesee Chief.115 Then it was
done with reference to our great rivers, at first through a confused coupling of the admiralty jurisdiction with the power over
commerce, 1 16 but finally freed from any such notion. 117 At
length it was done with reference to canals and other bodies of
water lying entirely within one state. 1 "
The conflicting decisions over the questions of federal civil
common law and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction can be
accounted for by the explanation that the Supreme Court realized, after a time, that its earlier decisions were too narrow and
not sufficiently supported by sound reasoning and social interests, and that when it came to this realization if treated them as
mere hypothetical conclusions to be abandoned when proven false.
(To be continued in February Number.)
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